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What is the relationship between magnitude judgments relying on directly available characteristics versus
probabilistic cues? Question frame was manipulated in a comparative judgment task previously assumed to
involve inference across a probabilistic mental model (e.g., “Which city is largest”—the “larger” question—
vs. “Which city is smallest”—the “smaller” question). Participants identified either the largest or smallest city
(Experiments 1a and 2) or the richest or poorest person (Experiment 1b) in a 3-alternative forced-choice
(3-AFC) task (Experiment 1) or a 2-AFC task (Experiment 2). Response times revealed an interaction between
question frame and the number of options recognized. When participants were asked the smaller question,
response times were shorter when none of the options were recognized. The opposite pattern was found when
participants were asked the larger question: response time was shorter when all options were recognized.
These task–stimuli congruity results in judgment under uncertainty are consistent with, and predicted by,
theories of magnitude comparison, which make use of deductive inferences from declarative knowledge.
Keywords: simple heuristics, congruity effect, magnitude judgments, response times
Two bodies of literature examine relative magnitude judgment:
one from a decision-making/heuristic perspective in which judg-
ments under uncertainty result in making choices based upon
search through appropriate probabilistic cues retrieved from mem-
ory (probabilistic mental models or inference from memory; Gig-
erenzer & Goldstein, 1996). For example, when making a judg-
ment about which of two cities is larger and the answer is not
known, a person needs to make an inference based on probabilistic
cues to largeness, such as whether one is a capital city. The other
body of literature, which takes a more psychophysical perspective,
typically examines judgments based on directly available charac-
teristics, either physically or in memory (e.g., determining which
of two digits is larger or which of two sounds is loudest; Banks,
Fujii, & Kayra-Stuart, 1976; Banks & Root, 1979). Both literatures
are concerned with judgments of the relative value of items along
a quantifiable-criterion scale (for simplicity, we refer to this simply
as magnitude), and both—potentially—make predictions regard-
ing the speed with which such judgments are made. We first
consider the two literatures separately and then discuss how the
psychophysically inspired framework used to study such judg-
ments under certainty might be applied to understanding the cog-
nitive processes involved in making judgments under uncertainty.
Furthermore, we examine whether response time (RT) effects
found using binary judgments (two-alternative forced choice, or 2
AFC) can be found in judgments under uncertainty using a three-
alternative forced choice (3AFC) task.
Inference Under Uncertainty
One of the most influential research programs examining judg-
ments under uncertainty in recent years has been the simple
heuristics approach of Gigerenzer and colleagues (Gigerenzer &
Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer,
Todd, & the ABC research group, 1999). Simple heuristics are
employed to solve problems whenever a probabilistic mental
model of the task is constructed to solve a general knowledge
question or judgment that cannot be solved by accessing or gen-
erating certain knowledge (e.g., by using deductive inference from
existing declarative knowledge; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Klein-
bölting, 1991). For example, the question “If you see the nation-
ality letter P on a car, is it from Poland or Portugal?” can be solved
either by information that is directly retrievable from memory or
by deductive inference from the information within memory (e.g.,
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“PL is Poland so it must be Portugal”). In contrast, the answer to
the question “Which country has the larger population, Poland or
Portugal?” cannot be deductively inferred and is unlikely to be
retrieved directly. Instead, a probabilistic judgment must be made.
The task on which simple heuristics have most frequently been
tested is the judgment of the “superiority” of an item compared
with its competitor along a particular criterion or dimension (Gig-
erenzer et al., 1999). In practice, this often reduces to a judgment
of relative magnitude across the dimension in question. For exam-
ple, judgments such as which of two countries (Poland or Portugal)
or cities (San Diego or San Antonio) has the larger population.
This problem can be addressed in multiple different ways, but one
of the best known simple heuristics is the recognition heuristic
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). This heuristic is invoked when
the mere recognition of an object is a predictor of the target
variable (e.g., recognition of a city name is a predictor of popula-
tion size). Under these conditions, participants typically infer that
a recognized item is more likely to be larger than an unrecognized
item. This notion is supported by data showing that direct esti-
mates of magnitudes for unrecognized target items are systemati-
cally smaller than those for recognized items (Brown, 2002; P. J.
Lee & Brown, 2004; see also Figures 3 and 7 in Schweickart &
Brown, 2013). It is also supported by various empirical observa-
tions that the recognized item is often chosen over an unrecognized
item when paired comparisons are made (Gigerenzer & Brighton,
2009; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), although the exact reasons
for this result are disputed (Hilbig & Richter, 2011; see also
McCloy, Beaman, Frosch & Goddard, 2010, and Pachur, Todd,
Gigerenzer, Schooler & Goldstein, 2011, for discussions).
The simple heuristics approach in which a single “best” cue
(such as recognition) is used to inform judgment is often con-
trasted with a more traditional view in which all available evidence
is integrated to provide an “optimal” weighting of the information
available, with the judgment going towards the option which has
the majority of the (appropriately weighted) information in its
favor. Such opposing views about how information is processed
exist within other domains within cognitive psychology too. For
example, Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe, and Sullivan (2003) demon-
strated that the visual system is far more frugal in collecting data
from the environment than has previously been suggested; people
only process visual information “just in time” if the current goal
requires it. Similarly, frugal processing has been demonstrated in
location memory (Lansdale, Humphries & Flynn, 2013) in that
participants memorized locations with reference to one anchor
point at the expense of more precise and more costly processing,
which would have required two anchor points.
Within the domain of judgment and decision making, direct
comparisons of the simple heuristics approach and the optimal
weighting approach have given mixed results when based on the
choices made by individuals (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gold-
stein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Hilbig & Richter, 2011; M. D. Lee &
Cummins, 2004; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; Newell, Weston &
Shanks, 2003). An alternative is to use RT data. In comparing
different models of judgment and decision making, RT data are
invaluable in distinguishing between the cues consulted to inform
judgment, particularly if cues are consulted serially and singly. For
example, faced with a pair of alternatives that cannot be discrim-
inated by the first few cues in a rank-ordered list of “best” cues
(the take the best heuristic; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), indi-
viduals using this process naturally take longer to come to a
decision than when the very first cue is discriminatory (Bergert &
Nosofsky, 2007; Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007; Pachur & Hertwig,
2006).1 For example, if a judgment between two cities is made
based on recognition of only one of the cities, judgments should be
quicker than if both cities are recognized because additional cues
need to be recruited if recognition is not itself a useful cue.
Inference From Certain Knowledge
As N. R. Brown and colleagues have pointed out (N. R. Brown
& Tan, 2011; Schweickart & Brown, in press), binary comparison
tasks of the kind employed in the investigation of the heuristics
assumed to underlie probabilistic inference under uncertainty were
previously investigated—using RT data—by an earlier generation
of psychophysically inspired researchers also interested in magni-
tude comparisons (e.g., Banks, 1977). A key difference between
magnitude comparison and simple heuristic accounts of relative
magnitude judgment is that heuristics simply return which of the
options under consideration is likely to be larger, whereas magni-
tude comparison accounts include an estimate of overall absolute
magnitude (e.g., the comparison process yields information as to
whether both items are particularly large or small, not just which
is larger). In particular, this earlier research program aimed to
explain the origin of several well-established RT phenomena,
including the symbolic distance effect and the semantic congruity
effect (henceforth, the congruity effect; Banks et al., 1976), effects
that reveal the availability of some (albeit possibly coarse-grained)
absolute magnitude information.
The symbolic distance effect refers to the finding that RTs are
inversely proportional to the difference between the two compared
items on the comparison of interest. Responses to the question of
whether the digit 9 is greater than 2 are faster than responses to the
question of whether the digit 4 is greater than 2, for example. The
congruity effect refers to the finding that large values on a con-
tinuum (e.g., number, intensity, luminance etc.) are more rapidly
compared when participants are asked, “Which is larger?,”
whereas small values are more rapidly compared when participants
are asked, “Which is smaller?” In other words, participants are
faster to compare two values when their overall magnitude is
perceived to be congruent with the verbal phrasing of the question.
Research by N. R. Brown and Tan (2011) and by Schweickart
and Brown (2013) confirmed a classic symbolic distance effect for
decisions where simple heuristics might be considered applicable
concerning which of two vehicles was the more expensive (N. R.
Brown & Tan, 2011) or the relative gross domestic product (GDP)
of two countries, even when one of the countries was unrecognized
(Schweickart & Brown, 2013). RTs were slower when the price of
vehicles or the GDPs of the countries were closer together, even if
highly valid probabilistic cues were available which clearly dis-
criminated between the two options. Thus, problem situations that
involved magnitude comparison gave rise to symbolic distance
effects regardless of whether they could be solved directly (the
classic finding) or by means of a heuristic-based probabilistic
inference. These findings were taken as evidence for a magnitude
comparison process during which magnitude values are generated
1 Some accumulator models, where one item has strong evidence, may
make similar predictions (see Teodorescu & Usher, 2013, for a review).
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or retrieved for each item in the pair prior to a comparison process.
This explanation provides an alternative framework to the simple
heuristics approach in which the generation of magnitude values
per se is not required, and hence a symbolic magnitude effect is not
anticipated if appropriate cues to magnitude can be utilized at an
early stage (e.g., if the cars are of a different status class—luxury
or nonluxury brands—this information could inform a simple
heuristic; N. R. Brown & Tan, 2011).
Multiple ways of comparing magnitude are possible within
a magnitude comparison account, just as multiple heuristics
might—in principle—be applied to a probabilistic mental model.
N. R. Brown and colleagues (Brown & Tan, 2011; Schweickart &
Brown, 2013) discussed the symbolic distance effect with refer-
ence to two-stage magnitude comparison models in which magni-
tudes are generated and then compared (e.g., the semantic coding
model, Banks, 1977; and the scan-plus comparison, Moyer &
Bayer, 1976; Moyer & Dumais, 1978). An alternative model, not
discussed by N. R. Brown and colleagues, suggests a single-stage
process in which the information retrieved about each item in the
pair is compared with an ideal end point (Dehaene, 1989; Holyoak,
1977; Jamieson & Petrusic, 1975). All three models, however,
predict both symbolic distance and semantic congruity effects (see
Duncan & McFarland, 1980, for a discussion). For simplicity’s
sake, we describe only the operation of single-stage models. Noth-
ing that follows is reliant upon a single-stage, rather than a two-
stage, magnitude comparison model (such as semantic coding or
scan-plus-comparison). In the following series of experiments, we
aimed simply to examine whether—in addition to the symbolic
distance effects already documented—congruity effects can also
be obtained under conditions where a probabilistic inference is
required and either a magnitude comparison or a simple heuristic
process might apply.
The Congruity Effect in Magnitude Comparison Tasks
Empirically, the congruity effect is well established within the
magnitude comparison literature. The “choose smaller” condition
is often slower overall than the “choose larger” condition (De-
haene, 1989), but the purest form of the congruity effect—a
crossover interaction between question frame and magnitude—has
been observed with a diverse range of attributes (Banks & Flora,
1977; Holyoak & Mah, 1982; Jamieson & Petrusic, 1975), includ-
ing brightness (Audley & Wallis, 1964), loudness (Banks & Root,
1979), or number (Cantlon & Brannon, 2005). These results were
obtained under conditions of certainty (the answer is known; e.g., “Is
2 larger than 4?”) where a deductive inference could be made from
declarative knowledge rather than under uncertainty (the answer is
probably unknown to the participant; e.g., “Is Paris larger than Lon-
don?”) where a heuristic inference based upon a probabilistic mental
model might apply (Gigerenzer et al., 1991). However, in principle, a
magnitude comparison process could apply to either situation as
shown by N. R. Brown and Tan (2011) and Schweickart and Brown
(2013). Our first aim, therefore, was to determine whether congruity
effects are observable when any inferences made must be made
probabilistically and are not deductively valid.
To account for the congruity effect, single-stage magnitude
comparison models assume that the “larger” question sets up a
large reference point against which the stimuli are compared (e.g.,
9, if the question were about digits, or London, if the question was
about U.K. cities). Items close to this external referent can be
compared more quickly (are more discriminable, in Jamieson and
Petrusic’s [1975] terminology). Hence, faster judgments are made
if the stimuli are large (close to the referent) than if they are small
(far from the referent). Similarly, if the question asks for the
smallest item, a “small” external referent (e.g., 0) is established,
and hence judgments are faster for small items. Thus, a crossover
interaction is observed in the RT data.
As a concrete example, under conditions where a probabilistic
mental model might apply, if a pair of items to be compared
happen to be the second and third largest cities in Germany
(Hamburg and Munich), and the task is to judge which of these two
is the largest, then the chosen reference point might be the largest
city in Germany (Berlin). From the perspective of Berlin, these
cities are easy to discriminate (e.g., when placed in rank order of
size, their ratio is 2:3), whereas cities further down the list (e.g., the
ninth and 10th largest cities, Düsseldorf and Bremen) are further
away from Berlin, and the ratio of the difference is much smaller
(9:10 in this case). Hence, the cities are much less discriminable
along this dimension, and the judgment accordingly takes longer.
Alternately, if the reference point is the 11th largest city (Duis-
burg) then counting back from this point, the position is reversed:
the ratio for Düsseldorf and Bremen becomes 2:3 and the ratio for
Hamburg and Munich is 9:10.
This form of ratio comparison is used in recent influential theories
of memory and classification (G D A Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007),
which include models of semantic memory (Kelley, Neath & Surpre-
nant, 2013). All that is needed to produce congruity effects, therefore,
is the assumption that if asked to judge “Which is larger,” a large
reference point (such as Berlin) is chosen, whereas if the question is
“Which is smaller,” a smaller reference point (such as Duisburg) is
chosen. The choice of reference points dictating later judgments is
reminiscent of certain aspects of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tver-
sky, 1979), and like that theory, the framework is mathematical/
psychophysical and does not provide the mechanistic detail needed to
formulate a process model. We defer consideration of these details
until the General Discussion.
In our experiments, we assumed that a set of items that are all
recognized would be likely to be viewed, at the time of choice, as
a large set (i.e., recognition is taken as a cue for largeness). A set
of items of which none are recognized would, in contrast, be
viewed as a set of small items, (i.e., lack of recognition is taken as
a cue for smallness). Hence, if this assumption is correct, for a
congruity effect to be observed, RTs should be faster when par-
ticipants are asked to indicate the largest of a set of items that are
all recognized than when they are asked to indicate the largest of
a set of items that are all unrecognized (largeness congruity).
When participants are asked to indicate the smallest of a set of
items, all of which are unrecognized, then RTs should be faster
than when they are asked to indicate the smallest of a set of
recognized items (smallness congruity). In other words, there
should be an interaction between question frame and number of
items recognized. Although the assumption we made about recog-
nition informing magnitude judgments derives from the simple
heuristic framework, the congruity effect itself is not predicted by
any heuristic we are aware of within this framework but instead is
predicted by a magnitude comparison process of the kind outlined
earlier, wherein judgment is ultimately based upon forming an
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overall impression of size rather than merely direct comparison of
different cues to size.
In all experiments, we varied the question frame so that partic-
ipants made judgments requiring them to identify the item with the
smallest magnitude as well as the item with the largest magnitude.
In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants made judgments in three-
alternative forced-choice (3-AFC) questions about city size (Ex-
periment 1a) and wealth (Experiment 1b). These experiments
represent a departure from the more usual binary comparison task
used exclusively in magnitude comparison studies and almost
exclusively in studies of simple heuristics and probabilistic mental
models and therefore provide a novel testing ground for RT studies
of both frameworks. However, there are good theoretical (Beaman,
2013; McCloy, Beaman & Smith, 2008) and empirical (Frosch,
Beaman & McCloy, 2007; Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler, Gold-
stein & Gigerenzer, 2010) reasons to believe that the use of
heuristics should generalize to multiple-alternative comparisons,
and there is likewise no a priori reason to suppose that magnitude
comparisons should not also do so. In Experiment 2, we employed
a 2-AFC task with city names to confirm that the novel findings
from Experiment 1 are also observed in the type of binary judg-
ments that has been used exclusively in magnitude comparison
tasks up until this point. In this experiment, we also addressed the
possibility that time to recognize the items might be influencing
our results by statistically controlling the recognition times for
each name.
Experiment 1
In Experiments 1a and 1b, we used a 3-AFC approach to
simultaneously test two hypotheses: the prediction of a congruity
effect that relates to the RTs for situations where either all
names are recognized or all names are unrecognized and the
prediction that—whenever possible, that is, when some items
are not recognized—no information other than “mere” recogni-
tion is consulted before the magnitude inference is made (Gold-
stein & Gigerenzer, 2002). For example, according to the simple
heuristics framework, the fastest RTs should appear when only one
of the items is recognized and the fact of recognition informs the
decision. For 2-AFC, this is true regardless of whether the question
asks for the larger or the smaller of the two items, as the two
questions are logically equivalent. A more interesting situation
emerges when more than two items are presented. For example,
when three items are presented and one is recognized, then fast
RTs might be anticipated if the task is to identify the largest of the
three. The reason for this speed advantage is that when only one
item is recognized, the decision maker can quickly identify the
largest item by consulting only one cue for one item, namely,
recognition. However, when three items are presented and two are
recognized but the “smaller” question is posed, then the position
reverses—now the anticipated faster responses are associated with
a situation in which two items are recognized and one is not. This
is because under these circumstances, lack of recognition is the cue
relevant to the judgment being made and hence the judgment can
be made quickly as one item can be identified with aid of this
recognition (or lack of recognition) cue. Thus, if we employed a
3-AFC choice judgment task, then a RT advantage would be
predicted across two different situations: for the recognize–1 sit-
uation with the “larger” question and in the recognize–2 situation
with the “smaller” question. Conversely, a congruity effect would
manifest itself as faster RTs if all the items are recognized when
the larger question is asked (relative to when the smaller question
is asked) and faster RTs if none of the items are recognized when
the smaller question is asked (relative to when the larger question
is asked).
To summarize, the hypotheses for this experiment were as
follows: First, the recognition heuristic—the idea that recognition
is used as the sole cue to inform judgment (Goldstein & Gigeren-
zer, 2002)—predicts that faster responses should be seen when
only one item is recognized and the “larger” question is asked.
This is the standard question for most studies of comparative
judgment, in which the participant is required to indicate which
option is the best along the criterion given (e.g., “Which city is
largest”). Faster responses should also be seen, however, when n
1 items are recognized and the “smaller” question is asked (e.g.,
“Which city is smallest?”; Frosch et al., 2007; McCloy et al.,
2010). These hypotheses are based upon the presumption that—all
else being equal—a response that requires only a single cue to be
consulted (recognition) should be faster than a response that re-
quires multiple cues to be employed. These predictions assume, as
per Pachur and Hertwig (2006), that retrieval of the recognition
cue precedes retrieval of any other information.
In contrast to the predictions derived from the recognition
heuristic that focus on judgments where some items are recog-
nized, the magnitude comparison framework makes specific pre-
dictions in circumstances when all items or none of the items are
recognized. Accordingly, it predicts an interaction such that RTs
are faster when the stimuli and the question are congruent, that is,
fast RTs when the “larger” question is asked and all three items are
recognized, and the opposite pattern (fast RTs when no items are
recognized) when the smaller question is asked. This is a novel
prediction based upon the application of notions of congruity to
magnitude judgments other than the purely numerical/semantic
(Banks & Flora, 1977; Banks et al., 1976; Dehaene, 1989; Holyoak
& Mah, 1982) or psychophysical (Audley & Wallis, 1964; Banks
& Root, 1979) and where all versus none of the items are recog-
nized. In Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b, we tested these ideas
using the same experimental structure but different sets of stimuli
and different participants.
Method
Participants. Seventy-five adult volunteers (30 men and 45
women) took part; 40 in Experiment 1a and 35 in Experiment 1b.
Their average age was 26 years (range 19–54).
Materials and design. The experiment was presented on a PC
laptop using dedicated Visual Basic software that recorded the
choice that the participant made and the time taken to make the
choice. Stimuli were constructed based on a set of real and fic-
tional city names (adapted from Oppenheimer, 2003), which have
previously been found to elicit moderately high levels of respond-
ing consistent with use of the recognition heuristic (McCloy et al.,
2010). For Experiment 1a, participants were presented with 200 triplets
of city names. Each triplet was paired with one of two questions: either
“Which is the largest?” or “Which is the smallest?” Presentation of
the two questions was blocked and counterbalanced. Participants
indicated their responses by means of a button press. For Exper-
iment 1b, we selected a range of names from the annually pub-
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lished Sunday Times Rich List (a list of the 1,000 richest individ-
uals in the United Kingdom together with estimates of their actual
wealth), and because, at the time of testing, this domain had not
been used before, we pretested the names for recognition. Names
considered to carry intrinsic clues to wealth independent of rec-
ognition (e.g., double-barreled, titled, or otherwise “aristocratic-
sounding” names) were excluded from the sample. The names
were thus obtained using the same method from the same source as
Frosch et al. (2007); hence, the same highly positive correlation
between recognition and criterion (wealth) applied (r  .73).
Participants were presented with the same 120 triplets of names
taken from the Rich List—30 triplets were made up of names that
were recognized by only few pretest participants, 30 triplets con-
tained one recognizable name (i.e., which was recognized by most
pretest participants) and two unrecognizable names (i.e., not rec-
ognized by many pretest participants), 30 contained two recogniz-
able names and one unrecognizable name, and 30 contained three
recognizable names. Each triplet was paired with one of two
questions: either “Who is the richest?” (60 triplets) or “Who is the
poorest?” (60 triplets). For the “poorest” question (smaller on the
wealth criterion), the recognition-criterion correlation is identical
in magnitude to that for the “richest” question (larger on the wealth
criterion) but is negative rather than positive.
Procedure. Participants were informed that they would be
presented with a series of choices about three towns or cities
(Experiment 1a) or about three names (Experiment 1b). The choice
would be to identify either the largest of the three towns or the
smallest of the three towns (Experiment 1a) or to identify the
richest of the three names or the poorest of the three names
(Experiment 1b). The question was visually presented on the
computer screen above the list of options. Participants made their
choice by pressing one of three keys on the keyboard representing
the left-hand, middle, or right-hand option. Participants were given
a maximum of 3 s in which to make their choice. The time
available was visually represented to participants by a countdown
bar that appeared below the options on the computer screen.
Following the final choice, participants were presented with a list
of all the towns or cities (Experiment 1a) or names (Experiment
1b) they had seen and were asked to indicate by checking a box
next to the name which options they recognized prior to the task.
This procedure enabled us to retrospectively identify for each
participant which name triples contained recognized and unrecog-
nized names, and hence it was possible to conclude whether
judgments were made in accordance with the recognition heuristic.
Results and Discussion
We first examined whether recognition was indeed used as a cue
to magnitude by ensuring that participants chose recognized names
when identifying the largest/richest and unrecognized names when
identifying the smallest/poorest. Any congruity effects we find in
the RTs can only be interpreted if this prerequisite is met. The
number of options recognized was determined individually for
each participant based on his or her responses to the final task
where they indicated which names they recognized prior to the
experiment. Next, we examined the RTs in order to establish
whether they were consistent with a congruity effect (fastest RTs
for smallest questions when no items were recognized and fastest
RTs for largest questions when all items were recognized) or
predictions derived from the simple heuristics framework (fastest
RTs for smallest questions when only one item was not recognized
and fastest RTs for largest questions when only one item was
recognized). Figure 1 shows participants’ mean RTs by the number
of names they recognized for both Experiments 1a (upper panel)
and 1b (lower panel).
Recognition as a cue to magnitude. First, we tested whether
participants used recognition as a cue to magnitude. For Experi-
ment 1a, participants in the experiment reliably made choices
consistent with use of the recognition heuristic. For the larger
question, when participants recognized one out of three names,
they chose the recognized option significantly more often than at
chance, t(39)  9.82, Cohen’s d  1.55, p  .001, at a rate of
64%. When they recognized two out of three names, they also
chose a recognized name significantly more often than chance,
t(39) 10.32, d 1.65, p .001, at a rate of 86%. For the smaller
question, when participants recognized one out of three names,
they chose the recognized option at approximately chance level
(32%), t(39)  0.2, d  0.03, p  .05. When they recognized
two out of three names, they chose a recognized option signifi-
cantly less often than chance, t(39)  3.48, d  0.55, p  .001,
52% of the time on average.
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Figure 1. Time to choose as a function of question and number of options
recognized. Values are untransformed means values. Bars are standard
errors. Experiment 1a (size of cities) is upper panel and Experiment 1b
(wealth of people) is lower panel. Median values for key data points in each
of these experiments are as follows: Experiment 1a, zero recognition 1,874
ms and 1,731 ms (larger and smaller questions, respectively), full recog-
nition 1,673 ms and 1,831 ms (larger and smaller questions), and Experi-
ment 1b, zero recognition 2,049 ms and 1,925 ms (larger and smaller
questions, respectively), full recognition 1,986 ms and 2,193 ms (larger and
smaller questions).
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For Experiment 1b, for the larger question (who is richest),
when participants recognized one out of three names, they chose
the recognized option significantly more often than at chance, 72%
of the time, t(34)  12.60, d  2.13, p  .001. When they
recognized two out of three names, they also chose a recognized
name significantly more often than chance, 87% of the time,
t(34)  10.13, d  1.71, p  .001. For the smaller question (who
is poorest), when participants recognized one out of three names,
they chose the recognized option significantly less often than
chance, 25% of the time, t(34)  12.19, d  2.06, p  .001.
When they recognized two out of three names, however, they did
not choose a recognized option significantly less often than
chance, 39% of the time, t(34)  1.59, d  0.27, p  .122.
Overall, the choice data for the two experiments indicate that
recognition was indeed a cue to largeness (Experiment 1a) and
wealth (Experiment 1b) as participants tended to choose recog-
nized options for the largest/richest questions but less so for the
smallest/poorest questions.
RT data. Next, we considered the time taken to respond to the
question posed, in order to test for a congruity effect and examine
the predictions derived from the simple heuristics framework. For
Experiment 1a, analysis of the time taken to respond using
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with question
and number of items recognized as within-participant factors
found no significant effect of question, F  1, p2  .011, all RT
data log-transformed. There was a significant effect of the number
recognized, F(3, 114)  5.23, mean square error (MSE)  0.007,
p2  .121, p  .002, and a significant interaction with question,
F(3, 114)  10.62, MSE  0.01, p2  .218, p  .001. For the
smaller question, participants’ choices were slower as the number
of names recognized in each triplet increased. For the “larger”
question, the opposite pattern appeared to hold, with participants’
choices becoming faster the more options they recognized (Figure
1, upper panel). With the larger question, there was a significant
congruity effect: RTs were significantly faster for the congruent
(recognize-all) condition than the incongruent (recognize-none)
condition, t(39)  5.28, d  0.68, p  .001. With the smaller
question, the difference between congruent (recognize none) and
incongruent (recognize all) conditions just missed significance,
t(38)  1.8, d  0.22, p  .07 (both tests two-tailed).
For Experiment 1b, repeated-measures ANOVA likewise found
no significant effect of question, F(1, 34)  1.62, MSE  0.007,
p2  .046, p  .211. There was a significant main effect of the
number of names recognized, F(3, 102)  3.70, MSE  0.004,
p2 .098, p .014, and a significant interaction between question
and response time, F(3, 102)  8.39, MSE  0.007, p2  .198,
p  .001. For the richer (equivalent to the larger) question,
participants’ choices appeared faster when all names were recog-
nized than when there was no recognition, but this result just
missed significance, t(34)  1.98, d  0.33, p  .056. With the
poorer (equivalent to the smaller) question, comparison of no and
full recognition was significantly faster for no recognition, t(34)
4.25, d  0.71, p  .001, consistent with congruent responding
(both tests two-tailed).
The form of the significant interaction shown in Figure 1 is as
expected on the basis of a congruity effect predicted by magnitude
comparison models. The tendency for participants to choose the
recognized item more frequently than chance when asked the
larger question (and the unrecognized item more frequently than
chance when asked the smaller question) is consistent with the
working assumption that participants, implicitly or otherwise, view
recognized items as larger than unrecognized items, an assumption
that also forms the basis of the recognition heuristic. Thus, the
precondition for interpreting the crossover interaction as a conse-
quence of congruity, rather than as a new and previously uncon-
sidered effect, appears to have been met.
Consistent with Hilbig and Pohl (2009), there was no sign that
selection consistent with recognition-only inference (the one rec-
ognized item in the larger question condition or the one unrecog-
nized item in the smaller question condition) was faster than using
knowledge to choose between multiple-recognized items. As Fig-
ure 1 shows, numerically at least, participants appear slightly
slower on average to choose the single recognized item when
asked the larger question. However, like Hilbig and Pohl (2009),
this experiment used cities as stimuli, and it is possible that there
is something unusual with either this domain generally or these
stimuli specifically. In particular, the cities used here were a mix
of real and fictional places as was also used by Oppenheimer
(2003). Pachur, Bröder and Marewski (2008) criticized the use of
these particular fictional materials because they allowed for an
informed guess about their country of origin that may have af-
fected the inferences participants made about these. It is also
impossible to calculate the validity of recognition as a cue to
judgment for fictional items. Thus—although the choice data are
consistent with the use of the recognition heuristic—a precondition
of employing the recognition heursitic (e.g., Volz et al., 2006) has
technically not been met. However, in Experiment 1b, we used
different stimuli, a different domain (wealth judgment), and a new
pair of questions (richer or poorer), to which these criticisms do
not apply. The employment of a set of stimuli, for which verifiable
“correct” answers can be provided, also allowed us to estimate the
validity of recognition as a judgment cue and the same pattern of
data was observed in Experiment 1b as in Experiment 1a. RTs in
both experiments follow the same patterns despite the difference in
stimuli and choice dimension (city size or wealth).
These data pose a challenge for a sequential-step view of the
application of simple heuristics. The larger (“Which is largest,”
“Who is richest?”) and smaller (“Which is smallest,” “Who is
poorest?”) questions reliably produced RT data that are approxi-
mate mirror images, one of the other. The crossover interaction,
indicating a congruity effect between question and number recog-
nized, predicted by magnitude comparison models (e.g., Jamieson
& Petrusic, 1975) was statistically significant. In all cases, with a
greater question, the slowest response was to situations where no
items were recognized. Fast RTs were observed for situations in
which all items were recognized. Conversely, with a lesser ques-
tion, fast RTs were observed when no items were recognized and
RTs were slower when all the items were recognized. Consistent
with Hilbig and Pohl (2009), there was no evidence that
recognition-only inference was faster when it could potentially be
applied (recognized only one item) than when knowledge would
necessarily be required on top of recognition (recognize two out of
three items; see Figure 2; and for a model of this situation, see
Beaman, 2013).
In summary, the results of Experiment 1a and 1b are broadly
consistent, indicating that congruity effects occur over at least two
domains previously investigated in the context of probabilistic
mental models and simple heuristics. However, Experiment 1 used
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a 3-AFC rather than the traditional 2-AFC task. The question
frame manipulation also appeared within a repeated-measures de-
sign, and therefore there may be concerns about task-switching
costs (Monsell, 2003), even though presentation was blocked, not
randomized. Finally, potentially Experiment 1 had problems in the
RT measures taken, notably the confounding, within the experi-
mental design, of time to recognize with time to decide. This
confound is unlikely to be a major issue as the congruity effect
presents as an interaction between number recognized and ques-
tion asked. For the congruity effect to occur, the overall RT should
increase as a function of the number of items when one question is
asked, but not the other. For example, suppose RT increases with
the number of items that are unrecognized because of an increase
in RT, not decision time. Overall RT would increase as the number
of recognized items decreased regardless of question type. This
pattern appeared in Experiment 1 only when the smaller question
was asked and the opposite pattern occurred when the larger
question was asked; hence, a congruity effect was observed. This
interaction was not anticipated on the basis of any effect of
recognition time on the number of items recognized. Experiment 2
provided a check that the congruity effect is observable within
more traditional binary-choice judgments (and is not an unforeseen
artifact of expanding the number of items to choose between),
addressed the possibility that task-switching may have impacted
upon the results of Experiment 1, and provided further evidence
that the congruity effect is independent of the (potentially con-
founding) time to recognize the items.
Experiment 2
The data from the previous experiments are consistent in show-
ing a congruity effect across the two domains considered in 3-AFC
tasks, but there remains a methodological gap between these
results and the magnitude comparison literature data showing the
same finding. We hope to establish a congruity effect for judg-
ments under uncertainty as for judgments under certainty (e.g.,
when digit 9 is known to be greater than 5), using domains (city
size, individual wealth) previously employed to investigate the
application of simple heuristics. However, unlike here, the mag-
nitude comparison literature employed exclusively binary choices.
In Experiment 2, we directly examined the possibility of a seman-
tic congruity effect in a more traditional binary (or paired-) choice
task. Data from a previous, unpublished, study, carried out when
participants were under time pressure, suggested that this would be
the case. Figure 2 shows descriptive statistics from this condition
both when “timed-out” responses are treated as missing data and
when they are assigned a maximum value as in the analysis of that
experiment. A funnel-shaped interaction indicative of a congruity
effect is evident. Once again, a main effect of number recognized
could be dismissed as an artifact of time taken to verify that an item
is recognized; the interaction effect which constitutes the expected
pattern of congruity results cannot be dismissed in this way.
To continue to examine the possibility of recognition heuristic
involvement in these judgments, we employed a multinomial pro-
cessing tree model, the r model (Hilbig, Erdfelder & Pohl, 2010),
as a means of simultaneously estimating recognition validity (the
a parameter in the model) and recognition heuristic usage (the r
parameter in the model). Where simple choice of a recognized item
might be for reasons beyond recognition per se, use of this model
allowed us to be more confident in estimating the extent to which
recognition itself (rather than recognition plus extra knowledge) is
used to inform judgment by finding the best fitting set of parameters
for use of recognition and use of knowledge. This also allowed us to
examine more closely the use of this heuristic when answering both
the larger and the smaller questions (McCloy et al., 2010).
Method
Participants. Our sample was composed of 87 University
College London participant panel volunteers who took part in
return for a small honorarium. Fourteen participants who recog-
nized five or fewer city names or 16 or more city names were
excluded from the analysis, because for those participants there
were insufficient data points per condition in one or more of the
conditions for the data to be reliable (recall that analysis compares
RTs for trials where no items were recognized with RTs for trials
where all items were recognized). Three participants who had very
extreme RTs2 were also excluded. The remaining 70 participants
had a mean age of 26 years (range 17–47). There were 32 women
and 38 men.
Materials and design. We employed a between-participants
design in which participants either judged which of a pair of two
Canadian cities was smaller or larger. Nineteen Canadian cities
2 Two participants had very low RTs throughout (one had a mean of 437
ms [SD  243], and the other had a mean of 386 ms [SD  411]). A third
person had a very high mean of 3,810 ms (and a very large SD of 7,866).
500
550
600
650
700
750
20
D
ec
is
io
n 
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
Number Recognized
richer
poorer
500
550
600
650
700
750
20
D
ec
is
io
n 
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
Number Recognized
richer
poorer
Figure 2. Response time for paired-choice data as a function of question
and number of options recognized. Upper panel shows timed-out responses
treated as missing data, and lower panel shows the same data with timed-
out responses replaced by a maximum response time.
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were paired to produce 174 pairings3 to be judged. The materials
were presented in a different random order to each participant. The
task was presented using E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman,
& Zuccolotto, 2002) on a desktop PC.
Procedure. There was no time limit on making judgments,
but participants were asked to make their responses as quickly as
possible. They responded by pressing the “a” key to choose the
city on the left and the “l” key to choose the city on the right. On
completion of the 174 judgments, participants completed a post-
judgment recognition task in which each of the city names pre-
sented in the experiment was presented one at a time in different
random orders, and participants indicated (by pressing the “y” and
“n” keys) whether they recognized the cities from before partici-
pating in the experiment. RTs from this task were also recorded.
Results
As for the previous experiment, we begin by ensuring that
recognition was indeed used as a cue to magnitude by examining
whether the choices were consistent with the recognition heuristic.
Next, we examined the RTs in order to establish whether a con-
gruity effect existed for the binary choices made in this experi-
ment. Finally, we also applied a multinomial processing tree model
intended to measure the extent to which the recognition heuristic
was used without reference to other knowledge in order to make
the appropriate choices.
Recognition as a cue to magnitude. In both conditions, par-
ticipants made a choice consistent with the recognition heuristic
significantly more often than chance. For the larger question, they
chose the recognized option 85% of the time; one sample t test,
t(35)  16.32, d  2.72, p  .001, and for the smaller question,
they chose the unrecognized option 73% of the time; t(33)  5.9,
d  1.01, p  .001. Hence, the prerequisite for interpreting a
congruity effect is met. Consistent with McCloy et al. (2010)
participants in the larger condition made choices consistent with
the recognition heuristic significantly more often than participants
in the smaller condition; t(51.91)  2.78, d  0.66, p  .008.
RT data. Figure 3 shows the mean RTs for number of names
recognized by condition. A repeated-measures ANOVA on the
RTs for the conditions of either full or zero recognition only with
question frame as a between-participants factor revealed no main
effect of number recognized; F(1, 47)  1, MSE  0.113, p2 
.003, p .21, but a main effect of question type; F(1, 47) 18.97,
MSE  0.05, p2  .288, p  .001. There was also a significant
interaction between number recognized and question, F(1, 47) 
12.11, p2  .205, p  .001.4 The purest form of congruity effect,
a crossover interaction, is not evident in Figure 3, although De-
haene (1989, p. 558) noted that the congruity effect is, in practice,
often superimposed on top of other effects that may preclude a full
crossover effect and instead often appears as a funnel-shaped
interaction between instructions and the size of the stimuli (large
or small) where an advantage for the larger question is more likely
to be in evidence than for the smaller question.
Once again, we compared the RTs for the items where partici-
pants recognized none of the names with RTs for the items where
they recognized all of the names. In the smaller condition, the
participants were quicker to respond to the items when they did not
recognize any of the names (mean 1,552 ms) than when they
recognized both names (mean 1,677 ms), t(33)  2.01, d  0.31,
p  .05. In the larger condition, the participants responded more
quickly to the items where they recognized both names (mean
1,365 ms) than to the items where they recognized none (mean
1,460 ms), t(35)  2.1, d  0.20, p  .03. Note that, for the
smaller condition, this numerical difference between the untrans-
formed means in favor of the larger question is reversed by
log-transformation. There was no difference between the mean
RTs for the two question types when neither was recognized,
t(68)  1, but there was a significant difference between the two
question types when both were recognized, t(68)  2.17, d  0.5,
p  .03.
Controlling for recognition time. To investigate the contri-
bution of the time taken to recognize the items to the overall
response times, we followed a procedure similar to that used by
Hilbig and Pohl (2009). Accordingly, we calculated a separate
multiple regression for each participant where we predicted RTs
for each trial of the judgment task from the RTs for each item in
the pair taken from the postjudgment recognition task. We then
calculated revised means from the unstandardized residuals gen-
erated by the regression analyses. These revised means for trials
where either none or all items were recognized were then entered
into a repeated-measures ANOVA with question frame as
between-subjects factor. This analysis resulted in the loss of the
significant main effect of question type, F(1, 66)  1, p  .522,
but crucially the interaction remained significant, F(1, 66)  4.89,
MSE  345,863, p2  .069, p  .031.5 Planned comparisons
between the two question frames revealed a significant difference
when none of the items were recognized, t(66)2.64, d 0.65,
3 We intended to include 20 Canadian cities but due to an administrative
error the 20th city (Montreal) was only paired with two of the other cities
(Toronto and Vancouver).
4 Where the RTs for the incomplete recognition condition are included,
the corresponding statistics are F(2, 136)  4.85, p  .01, for the main
effect of number recognized; F(1, 68)  3.0, p  .09, for the main effect
of question; and, F(2, 136)  4.41, p  .01, for the interaction.
5 Where the RTs for the incomplete recognition condition are included,
the corresponding statistics are F(2, 132)  10.31, p  .001, for the main
effect of number recognized; F(1, 66)  1, p  .786, for the main effect
of question; and, F(2, 132)  2.5, p  .086, for the interaction.
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Figure 3. Experiment 2: Time to choose as a function of question and
number of options recognized. Bars are standard errors. Median values for
key data points are as follows: zero recognition 1,409 ms and 1,510 ms
(larger and smaller questions, respectively), full recognition 1,269 ms and
1,447 ms (larger and smaller questions).
49SIMPLICITY AND CONGRUITY
p .01, but no difference when both of the items were recognized,
t(66)  0.78, d  0.19, p  .44. The differences between recog-
nizing none of the items and recognizing all of them within each
of the question frames were no longer significant, t(33)  1.86,
d  0.35, p  .071 for the smaller condition, and t(33)  1.2,
d 0.21, p .24 for the larger condition. Hence, when controlling
for recognition time, we still observed the interaction between
question frame and number of items recognized, and this interac-
tion appeared to be driven by differences found when none of the
names were recognized.
Recognition and knowledge. For this set of data, we also
applied a multinomial processing tree model intended to measure
the extent to which the recognition heuristic was used without
reference to other knowledge in order to make the appropriate
choices. Alongside this, we also used the discrimination index
measure of Hilbig and Pohl (2008), another measure intended to
give some indication of the extent to which recognition is used as
the sole cue to decision making. The discrimination index is
calculated as the proportion of times the recognition heuristic is
used when it is valid, less the proportion of times it is used when
it is invalid. Multinomial processing tree models assume sequen-
tial, independent operations that can be expressed in terms of a
decision tree, with alternative processes at each branch point
associated with a parameter indicating the probability of traversing
that particular branch. The tree terminates in observable outcomes,
and the models are compared with the data by estimating the best
fitting parameters and comparing the frequency counts of each
outcome, obtained from experimental data, with the expected
outcomes given the parameters estimated. For a 2-AFC situation to
which the recognition heuristic could potentially be applied, there
are four free parameters that must be estimated: g is the probability
of a correct guess if neither of the options are recognized, b is the
probability of a correct choice if both options are known and
should be closely related to the knowledge validity of the domain,
a is the probability of a correct choice if the recognition heuristic
is used and reflects the recognition validity of the domain, and r is
the probability that recognition is used as the sole cue for infer-
ence. Thus, there are three decision trees arising from this situa-
tion: when both items are recognized, the probability of a correct
outcome is b and of an incorrect outcome is 1  b. Similarly, for
when none of the items are recognized, probability correct is g and
probability incorrect is 1  g. The more interesting possibilities
(shown in Figure 4) occur when only one item is recognized and
recognition can be used as the sole cue to judgment (or not) and,
if not, the unrecognized option could conceivably be chosen and,
of course, the outcome can be a correct choice (or not).
The results of fitting the r model using Moshagen’s (2010)
multitree software indicate that the best fitting parameters are a 
.85, b  .68, g  .53, and r  .54. This model gives a good fit to
the data, G2  .03, df  1, p  .86. The best fitting parameters
indicate that for this domain, recognition (a) provides a more
accurate cue than knowledge (b), but, despite this, recognition is
used as the sole cue on little more than 50% of occasions. This
general impression that recognition is not the sole cue used is
confirmed by the discrimination index (DI) where DI .48. These
data refer to the larger question.
Other research (McCloy et al., 2010) shows that the recognition
heuristic is employed less frequently when the smaller question is
asked. This previous research relied upon relatively insensitive
measures of adherence to the heuristic wherein a response was
scored as adhering to the heuristic when the greater question was
asked and a recognized item was chosen. In fact (as Figure 4
shows) recognized items might be chosen for reasons other than
recognition per se (e.g., a town might be recognized for a particular
reason, which leads to confidence that it is a large town). In the
current data set, the probability that a recognized item was chosen
was .85, whereas the best fitting r parameter was .54 (in line with
the range observed in past research; Beaman 2013; Hilbig, Erd-
felder, et al., 2010; Hilbig & Richter, 2011). This implies that
approximately 30% of the time the recognized item was chosen for
reasons beyond “mere” recognition. Thus, any reduction in recog-
nition heuristic-consistent choices in the smaller question condi-
tion here and in McCloy et al.’s (2010) study could have been for
reasons unconnected with the recognition heuristic. Hilbig, Scholl,
and Pohl (2010) applied the necessary r model analysis to similar
data—where a smaller question (addressing city population size)
produced a nonsignificant trend towards less reliance on the rec-
ognition heuristic than a larger question. However, in their report,
they identified concerns about the cross-experimental comparisons
that they conducted and that limited the conclusions they were able
to draw.
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recognition heuristic is used; b  probability of a correct choice if both options are known.
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Application of the same procedures to the smaller question
yielded DI  .60 and the r model revealed the following best
fitting parameters, a  .82, b  .67, g  .53, and r  .14. All of
these parameters, with the exception of r which we expected to be
lower, were within .03 of the values estimated for the larger
question. Despite this result, the model fit on this occasion was
considerably poorer, G2  3.82, df  1, p  .05. This was also
true for Hilbig, Erdfelder, et al. (2010), who reported p values for
differences between observed and expected data dropping from
.80–.99 in Experiment 1 (the larger question, G2 0.1) to .29–.32
in Experiment 2 (the smaller question; G2  1.1–14) although in
their case the model fits remained within the conventional bounds
of statistical acceptability.
One possible reason for the discrepancy in r model results is that
knowledge validity when two items are recognized (b2) need not
be identical to knowledge validity when one item is recognized
(b1). When both are recognized, it is necessary to distinguish
between two known items, whereas when one is recognized the
task is to determine whether the known item is of larger or smaller
magnitude than an unknown option (see Beaman, Smith, Frosch &
McCloy, 2010, p. 265 for a more analytical argument). In practice,
it appears that b1 is approximately equivalent to b2 with the greater
question, so both can be subsumed into a single performance
parameter, but this is an accuracy measure, not tied to any partic-
ular mechanism. The effect of knowledge validity on model fits is
likely to be particularly pronounced when the way in which
knowledge is applied varies, which, as argued by McCloy et al.
(2010), may be the case with the smaller question. Accordingly,
we retested the model allowing two knowledge parameters (b1 and
b2) but constraining g to equal .53 (as the best fitting parameter
value estimated from the larger question) since this ensures equiv-
alent df and the value of the guessing parameter is of no theoretical
consequence provided it is in the region of chance.6 Under these
constraints, the best fitting free parameters are a  .82 (as previ-
ously), b1  .66, b2  .69, and r  .12. This yielded an improved
fit to the data, G2  .01, df  1, p  .91. So, by both r and DI
measures and regardless which version of the r model is employed,
knowledge is being used much more with the smaller question than
the larger question. It seems likely that knowledge is also being
used in a different way for the smaller question given the differ-
ence in fits between the models.
General Discussion
The foregoing series of experiments have revealed two main
findings. The first finding is that judgments, in Experiment 1, were
no faster under conditions where only one item was recognized (or
in the case of the lesser question, only one item was not recog-
nized) than when all items were recognized (or in the case of the
lesser question, none of the items were recognized). This is incon-
sistent with the operation of a recognition heuristic alone, where
recognition precedes access to other information (Mandler, 1980)
and renders the search for further, discriminating information
unnecessary (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Pachur & Hertwig,
2006). The second main finding is that RT data indicate that the
time taken to respond to lesser and greater questions produce
approximate mirror images one of the other when plotted against
the number of options recognized. This finding is not predicted by
the stepwise application of simple heuristics only. It is also not an
obvious prediction of many compensatory decision-making proce-
dures (such as multiple regression or structural equation model-
ing), which take into account and weight multiple sources of
information about the options only and do not consider the effects
of possible reference points set up by the framing of the question.
The finding is predicted, however, by magnitude comparison mod-
els, which make use of a reference point established independent
of the items under consideration.
The establishment of a congruity effect on choices—particularly
paired-choices (Experiment 2)—made under uncertainty adds to
the data reported by Brown and Tan (2011) and Schweickart and
Brown (2013) showing a symbolic distance effect and provides
further support for the idea that a magnitude comparison process
(single- or dual-stage) may occur under circumstances previously
considered to test heuristic decision making. In contrast to N. R.
Brown and colleagues, we have chosen to present single- rather
than dual-stage magnitude comparison accounts as the single-stage
magnitude comparison models that involve comparisons relative to
an end point are conceptually similar to recent and intriguing
accounts elsewhere in the literature of discrimination between two
or more options in perception, memory, and decision making as a
ratio score relative to some other external referent (where the
reference point may be drawn from memory but is external to the
stimuli under consideration; G. D. A. Brown et al., 2007; Stewart,
Brown & Chater, 2005). Both single- and dual-stage magnitude
comparison models can account for the current data set, however.
These data suggest that similar processes may be involved in
judgments under uncertainty (previously considered the domain of
probabilistic mental models and simple heuristics) to judgments
where the answer can be directly retrieved or calculated (consid-
ered to involve deductive inferences from declarative knowledge).
Before any strong conclusions can be drawn from this suggestion,
however, it is necessary to consider alternative explanations.
One possible alternative account arises from Erdfelder, Küpper-
Tetzel and Mattern’s (2011) mental state heuristic. Erdfelder et al.
noted that the single threshold for recognition acceptance assumed
in applications of the recognition heuristic might be unrealistic.
Instead, they argued, a dual threshold exists both for accepting and
rejecting an item as “recognized.” Such an item can be recognized
(or rejected) with certainty, or it can recognized (or rejected) rather
more hesitantly (see Figure 5).
It is plausible that definite, or certain, decisions (either to
recognize or reject) should be faster than more hesitant decisions.
Such an account predicts a change in RTs as the number of items
subject to definite decisions (in either direction) increases. Thus, a
significant effect of number of items recognized would be expect-
ed—as the number of items definitely recognized increases, then
RTs should decrease, and as the number of items definitely re-
jected increases, then RTs should likewise decrease. Thus, com-
6 Note that setting the value of g at .53 might reflect a sampling error
since—if we have chosen stimuli such that there are no valid cues asso-
ciated only with the names of an otherwise unknown pair of items, and
performance is therefore at chance in this condition—we would expect g to
equal .50. Accepting this possibility means that any model that fits the data
with g wrongly set at .53 must be accurate in other respects, however, as
g constrains the degrees of freedom available but does not impact upon the
estimation of any other values (it only appears within a single decision-
tree).
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plete recognition (of all items) should be a relatively fast response
condition, and complete failure to recognize any item should also
be a fast response condition. This observation complicates the
situation with respect to whether the observed response times are
incompatible with the recognition heuristic (where one item only is
recognized, RTs might be slowed even if the heuristic is employed
because the recognition may not be definite; see also Pachur,
2011). The observation does not, however, bear upon the congruity
effect because, by this account, all responses in the “recognize-all”
condition should be faster—the semantically incongruent ones
(“Which item is the smaller?”) as well as the congruent (“Which
item is the larger?”). Similarly, the account predicts that responses
in the “failure-to-recognize” condition should also all be faster
regardless of the question asked (so larger question responses
should be speeded as well as smaller question responses), whereas
the current data show an interaction between recognition condition
and question that is not anticipated by Erdfelder et al.’s (2011)
hypothesis.
A number of other conclusions can also be drawn from the
current data. The r model is particularly informative in this regard.
It confirms McCloy et al.’s (2010) findings that recognition per se
is used less frequently as a cue when the smaller question is asked.
The model also indicates that—at least with the greater question—
the heuristic is used for a substantial number of choices (best
fitting estimate of r  .54). Thus, Schweickart and Brown’s (in
press) claim that the adoption of a magnitude comparison approach
obviates choosing between competing heuristics may be prema-
ture. The magnitude comparison approach also has difficulty in
accounting for the framing effect observed by McCloy et al. (2010)
(and confirmed here) that the smaller question elicits fewer
recognition-based responses than the larger question. In a magni-
tude comparison framework, both questions should be answered in
the same manner by estimating the magnitudes (according to the
assumptions of single- and dual-stage models) and making a
simple comparison. Thus, although the magnitude comparison
framework predicts the RT data reported here, neither it nor the
simple heuristics approach as yet fully account for the framing
effect observed on choices when logically equivalent questions are
asked. A further problem for the magnitude comparison frame-
work is the lack of a well-defined process model. Here, we have
favored the single-stage model, but the data are equally compatible
with two-stage models as presented by N. R. Brown and col-
leagues (Brown & Tan, 2011; Schweickart & Brown, 2013). One
means of attempting to provide a coherent overall framework for
judgments of this type would be to develop a process model in
which similarity between the options presented and a reference
point was calculated either in a holistic manner (requiring combi-
nation of available information in a compensatory manner) or
along particular dimensions independently, in a manner more akin
to either single-reason heuristic decision making or evidence ac-
cumulator models. The development of such process accounts of
single-(and dual-) stage magnitude comparisons is necessary to
provide a unified account of heuristic-like decision making within
a magnitude comparison framework.
Overall, the data suggest that models of comparative judgment
developed for comparing physical (e.g., loudness or brightness) or
symbolic (e.g., between digits) distances can be successfully ap-
plied to judgments that also require a search for appropriate cues
from which to infer magnitude. This highlights the usefulness of
searching “older” literatures for theories and data that may be
applicable to “newer” problems—a point that has been made
elsewhere (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1991)—and adds to the data already
provided by N. R. Brown and Tan (2011) and Schweickart and
Brown (2013), consolidating the general position outlined in those
articles. The approach taken here also reinforces the implicit point
of G. D. A. Brown and colleagues that psychophysical approaches
(here, from magnitude comparison, and in their studies from
relative judgment and satisfaction ratings) may be generalized
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Figure 5. Diagrammatic representation of the memory state heuristic of Erdfelder, Küpper-Tezel and Mattern
(2011) as it would appear as multinomial processing tree model. This heuristic predicts faster responses as the
number of items in either of the certainty states increases but does not predict an interaction between certainty
state and question frame. t  probability of old objects exceeding the recognition threshold; d  probability of
new objects falling below the rejection threshold; y  conditional probability of guessing yes in the uncertainty
state.
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outside the psychophysicist’s laboratory (Boyce, Brown, & Moore,
2010; G. D. A Brown, Gardner, Oswald, & Qian, 2008). More
specifically, a congruity effect can be added to the symbolic
distance effect as phenomena to be accounted for in n-AFC or
paired-choice decision tasks. In all cases, it appears, the direction
provided by the question framing influences the time required to
distinguish between options.
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